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Abstract
Learning and adaptation play great role in emergent socio-economic
phenomena. Complex dynamics has been previously found in the systems
of multiple learning agents interacting via a simple game. Meanwhile, the
single agent adaptation is considered trivially stable. We advocate the
idea that adopting a more complex model of the individual behavior may
result in a more diverse spectrum of macro-level behaviors. We develop
an adaptation model based on the reinforcement learning framework ex-
tended by an additional processing channel. We scrutiny the dynamics of
the single agent adapting to the unknown environment; the agent is biased
by novelty seeking, the intrinsic inclination for exploration. We demon-
strate that the behavior of the novelty-seeking agent may be inherently
unstable. One of the surprising results is that under certain conditions
the increase of the novelty-seeking level may cause the agent to switch
from the non-rational to the strictly rational behavior. Our results give
evidence to the hypothesis that the intrinsic motives of agents should be
paid no less attention than the extrinsic ones in the models of complex
socio-economic systems.
1 Introduction
A cornerstone of the complexity science is the notion of emergence, which implies
that high-level dynamical patterns may arise in a large-scale system as a result of
nonlinear interactions between simple entities comprising the system. It is often
stressed that complex phenomena emerge in such systems despite the simplicity
and even primitiveness of the individual elements, solely due to the interactions
between them. For this reason most models of complex systems tend to employ
the microscopic behavior models of minimal possible complexity.
However, there is reason to think that the increase of the model complexity
on the level of individual elements may result in richer macro-level behavior of
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the system as a whole. This in turn may help to better capture the diverse phe-
nomena observed in the real-world complex systems. The concept of emergence
due to individual complexity already proved useful, e.g., in studying the self-
organization in social insects [9, 24]. In the general field of computational social
science this issue is also acknowledged, so there is an increasing demand for
more advanced and authentic microscopic models of individual agent behavior;
“more mental complexity must be modelled to understand what are the specific
mental properties allowing social complexity to be managed and simplified” [7].
In the present paper we attempt to face this challenge.
1.1 Learning and adaptation in complex systems
Learning and adaptation are among the fundamental underlying principles of
non-equilibrium social science; “the non-equilibrium phenomena generated by
learning dynamics are a decisive battlefield for computational social science” [7].
Particularly, economics exploits the concept of learning in games as the non-
equilibrium alternative to the standard Nash equilibrium approach [1, 10, 11].
By adopting the perfect rationality hypothesis, the latter imposes “heroic as-
sumptions about the knowledge and calculating abilities of the players” [20].
The learning approach addresses this issue by focusing on the adaptive behav-
ior of the boundedly rational agents, who repeatedly play a game and gradually
learn efficient strategies. In the game-learning setting players often fail to come
up with a strategy (either pure or mixed) leading to the Nash equilibrium, so
the learning dynamics on its own becomes vital.
A great deal of literature emphasizes richness and complexity of learning
dynamics in games [12, 13, 19, 29, 30]. Even the simplest systems of two agents
learning to play the rock-paper-scissors game may produce quasiperiodic tori,
limit cycles, and deterministic chaos [29, 30]. Still, such complex behavior usu-
ally emerges as a result of the agent interaction, while the dynamics of the single
agent learning is generally presumed to be trivial. Specifically, the reinforcement
learning model used in virtually all relevant studies guarantees the stability of
the optimal strategy [28]. In the present study we follow the complementary
approach, hypothesizing that the individual adaptation may be intrinsically un-
stable and therefore might be a source of emergence on its own.
Indeed, in the vast majority of available studies on game theoretical learning
the agents are still assumed to be rational in a sense that they act selfishly and
optimally within the given setting. In fact, their rationality is bounded only in
the sense of having less a priori information, but their goal — to maximize the
total payoff throughout the whole process — remains ultimately rational. In
the course of learning the agent behavior is driven only by external factors —
the previously observed actions of other players and the revealed payoffs. In the
modern models of adaptation the agents basically lack any kind of non-rational
motives, they possess no emotions, desires, or personal preferences.
A fundamental feature of human beings, which may hypothetically have a
profound impact on the dynamics of adaptation, is the trait of novelty seek-
ing. Humans exhibit novelty-seeking behavior across a diverse range of circum-
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stances, ranging from choosing a vacation destination [17] to making critical
financial decisions [16]. According to Cloninger’s theory, novelty seeking is one
of the four basic human personality traits (with three others being reward de-
pendence, harm avoidance and persistence) [5]. In the context of learning nov-
elty seeking propels humans to actively learn and explore [8, 27]. Appealing to
previous studies on human novelty-seeking behavior, we develop a dynamical
model of single-agent adaptation as a richer alternative to standard reinforce-
ment learning.
We model the simple situation of a single agent facing an unknown envi-
ronment, which is represented by a number of rewarded actions. The agent
gradually learns the initially unknown rewards by making a repeated choice
between these actions (after the action is selected, the corresponding reward
is acquired); in general, the rewards may change over time. Canonically, the
ultimate goal of the agent is to maximize the total sum of the rewards gained
throughout the process.
In constructing the model we introduce the additional channel of informa-
tion processing to reinforcement learning. We then analyze in detail how the
adaptation dynamics change when the agent behavior is governed not only by
the external factors (that is, rewards), but also by the agent intrinsic motives,
namely, the inclination to engage in novel activities. What may be the impact
of novelty seeking on the dynamics of learning? Can we expect that the non-
rational motives change the agent behavior essentially? Do the intrinsic motives
deserve as close attention as the extrinsic ones? We attempt to answer these
and some other questions in the rest of the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Reinforcement learning
We construct a model for the adaptation dynamics of a single agent based on the
previously elaborated framework of reinforcement learning. An agent is assumed
to make repeated choice between finite number of alternatives (or actions, or
options) xi, i = 1, N . Each alternative is associated with the corresponding
reward ri > 0; generally the rewards are non-stationary: ri = ri(t). The agent
maintains the estimates qi of each action quality. At every time step tk = k∆
(k ∈ N, ∆ is the time step duration) the estimates qi are, first, updated with
currently received rewards ri, and, second, subjected to the memory loss effect
qi(tk+1) = qi(tk) + ri(tk)δiik −
∆
Tq
qi(tk) , (1)
where the index ik points to the alternative xi(tk) chosen at the given time step
tk. Constant parameter Tq is the agent memory capacity: the events in the past
separated from the present by the time considerably exceeding Tq practically do
not affect the agent behavior. At each time step only the actually chosen action
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receives reinforcement (i.e., foregone payoffs are not revealed), so δiik = 1 for
i = ik and δiik = 0 for i 6= ik (Kronecker delta).
The agent choice is randomized: the Boltzmann ansatz
pi =
eβqi∑
j
eβqj
, (2)
with the parameter β relates the probability pi of choosing the alternative xi to
the current estimate of its quality qi. Small values of β lead to the uniformly
random choice (pi = N
−1), while β →∞ yields the deterministic “winner-take-
all” choice: the action with the highest qi is always selected.
The discrete-time reinforcement learning is traditionally the most popu-
lar framework for describing learning and adaptation processes. However, a
continuous-time approximation of model (1) is more suitable for dynamical
analysis. When ∆  Tq and riβ  1 for i = 1, N , the learning agent has
to repeat the choice many times before getting the stable “opinion” about the
alternatives, so the following approximation [19, 28, 30] is valid:
q˙i = riψ(pi)− qi
Tq
. (3)
In the case of known foregone payoffs (which is not considered here) ψ(pi) ≡ 1,
so the system (2),(3) directly results [3] in the renowned replicator equation for
learning dynamics1, which is also widely employed in evolutionary game theory
and population ecology. The foregone payoffs are often concealed in the real-
world circumstances [14], hence, in the present paper we focus solely on this
case, so that in Eq. (3)
ψ(pi) = pi . (4)
According to Eqs. (2),(3),(4), the better rewarded actions are more valuable
for the agent, whereas the alternatives with low rewards ri are perceived as
inferior. However, the estimates qi of the options with low initial probabilities
pi are updated rarely and, hence, such actions are mostly ignored even if they
generate relatively high payoffs. This may cause the adaptation process to
stagnate at the initial values of qi and pi, which in fact has little physical
meaning.
In order to overcome this issue we assume that the obtained rewards ri
are weighted with respect to the frequency of the corresponding action: ri →
riw(pi), so that the quality estimate of a rarely selected action is effectively
remembered until the next choice of this action. The weighting function w(p) =
p−1 has been used in previous studies (see, e.g., [15, 18, 19]). Still, we believe
that the generalized ansatz
w(p) = p−γ , γ > 0 (5)
1 The replicator equation can also be derived for the case of unknown foregone payoffs
given that the adaptation dynamics is significantly slower comparing to the agent-environment
interactions (for detailed discussion see, e.g., [28]). However, under the latter assumption the
foregone payoffs effectively become known, because the agent has enough time to collect the
complete information on the current rewards ri prior to updating the probabilities pi.
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Figure 1: Two channels of information processing. Channel Q which processes
the information about the rewards continuously interacts with channel A which
deals with all the information not directly related to the rewards.
is more appropriate, incorporating the conventional one as a special case. The
drawback of this approach is that Eqs. (3),(4),(5) do not result in the standard
replicator dynamics, although we believe this is justified by the extra flexibility
of the obtained model. Finally, Eqs. (3),(4),(5) yield the governing equations
for the agent estimates of quality of options xi
q˙i = rip
1−γ
i −
qi
Tq
, i = 1, N. (6)
2.2 Extension of the reinforcement learning model
The reinforcement learning model (2),(6) draws on the assumption that, first,
the agent forms the estimates qi of quality of each action using the information
on the received rewards, and, second, the choice probabilities are based solely
on these estimates. We propose the extension of this model which assumes that,
first, the factors other than the tangible rewards may influence the agent choice,
and, second, these factors are evaluated via the separate processing mechanism.
In evaluating the alternatives during adaptation humans may employ the
information not directly related to the objectively available rewards. Such in-
formation may include, e.g., cost of taking the action, uncertainty of the agent
expectation about the corresponding reward and gain in the knowledge about
the environment that can be obtained via the action [25]. Accordingly, in our
model the agent assesses each option in two different ways. The “objective”
quality of each action xi is evaluated through channel Q and is described by vari-
able qi, whose dynamics essentially depend on the reward function ri (Eq. (6)).
On the other hand, the agent’s estimate of an option based on the information
other than the reward is characterized by the separate variable ai, which gen-
erally possesses its own dynamics within channel A (Fig. 1). The pair {qi, ai}
should directly determine the probability pi of choosing the action xi at each
time instant.
Evaluation of events, conscious and unconscious, is relative, for a discussion
see, e.g., [23]. Within the boundaries of our problem it means that an arbitrary
shift individual for the two channels, qi → qi +CQ and ai → ai +CA, where CQ
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and CA are some constants, should not affect the probability pi for any action
xi. In physics a dependence p(q, a) meeting this condition is well known, its the
Boltzmann or Gibbs distribution
pi(qi, ai) =
1
Z
exp
{
βQqi + βAai
}
. (7)
Here Z is the partition function whose list of arguments comprises the quan-
tities {qj , aj} for all the actions {xj}; it has been introduced to normalize the
probabilities {pi} to unity.
The constants βQ, βA are the characteristics of the set of actions {xj} and
should be regarded as system parameters. Their inverse values, 1/βQ and 1/βA,
actually specify the fuzzy thresholds of the agent perception; when for two
actions x1 and x2 the corresponding quantities {q1, a1} and {q2, a2} meet the
inequalities |q1 − q2| . 1/βQ and |a1 − a2| . 1/βA, the agent is not able to
distinguish between them in quality, and, consequently, has to regard the two
actions as equivalent, so their choice is equiprobable. Measuring the quantities
{qi} and {ai} in the units of their thresholds we can set βQ = 1 and βA = 1,
which will be used in the following constructions.
Finally, to complete the model we specify the concrete equations governing
the dynamics of the phase variables ai.
2.3 Novelty seeking and learning
Humans often tend to engage in novel activities despite rewards or harm yielded
by these activities. Novelty seeking is manifest in many situations and is classi-
fied as one of the fundamental human traits [4, 5, 6]. Novelty-seeking behavior
may perpetuate the process of learning [8, 26, 27], and, in addition, may enhance
the performance of the learning agent [21, 22]. In the model to be constructed
we hypothesize that the agent evaluates the available actions in part based on
the novelty of each action, i.e., how often the action has been selected in the
recent past.
The novelty of the action xi can be quantified by the choice probability pi:
the actions with low probabilities are considered as novel. On the other hand, it
may be interpreted in a sense that the agent becomes bored of the predominant
choices, even if they are highly valued in terms of rewards. Subsequently, we
propose the following equation governing the dynamics of ai
a˙i = φpi − ai
Ta
, (8)
where φ ≥ 0 indicates the sensitivity of the agent to the frequencies of the
alternatives. To put it another way, parameter φ quantifies the relative impact
of the novelty-seeking trait on the agent choice. Parameter Ta > 0 determines
the agent memory capacity in analogy to Tq in Eq. (6).
We wish to draw attention to the fact that, according to Eq. (8), high prob-
ability pi causes ai to grow, while low pi leads to decreasing ai. Thus, ai
characterizes in fact not the attraction, but rather the aversion of the agent to
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the option xi: the higher ai, the stronger the aversion. For this reason in our
model the effect of ai on choice probability pi is negative (cf. Eq. (7)):
pi(t) =
eqi−ai∑
j
eqj−aj
. (9)
Putting together Eqs. (6),(8),(9), we finally obtain the model of adaptation of
the novelty-seeking agent.
q˙i = rip
1−γ
i −
qi
Tq
, i ∈ {1, N},
a˙i = φpi − ai
Ta
,
pi =
eqi−ai∑
j
eqj−aj
.
(10)
3 Dynamics of learning
In the rest of the paper we analyze the dynamics of the model defined by
Eqs. (10). In order to concentrate on the very basic features of the model,
we confine our scope to the simplest case of two alternatives N = 2. More-
over, we assume that the environment changes slowly comparing to the agent
adaptation time scale, i.e., the reward function is effectively constant
ri(t) ≡ ri, i = 1, 2.
Before examining the properties of the model in case of equal rewards, we
denote r = (r1 + r2)/2,  = (r1 − r2)/2 and transform Eqs. (10) in order to
simplify the further analysis. Introducing the new variables q = q1−q22 , a =
a1−a2
2 and rescaling the time t→ Tat, we reduce Eqs. (10) to the dimensionless
system
τ q˙ = R
sinh((1− γ)(q − a))
cosh1−γ(q − a) + 
cosh((1− γ)(q − a))
cosh1−γ(q − a) − q,
a˙ = Φ tanh(q − a)− a,
(11)
where τ =
Tq
Ta
, R = r2γ−1Tq and Φ = φ2Ta. Positive values of q − a of order
unity correspond to the option x1 preferred over x2 (p1 ≈ 1), and values of q−a
close to zero mean that there is practically no difference between the options
for the agent (p1 ≈ p2 ≈ 0.5).
We emphasize that under the adopted assumptions the system (11) is equiv-
alent to Eqs. (10) and at the same time has less parameters. Hereafter we
investigate its properties depending on five parameters: R, γ, τ , Φ and . We
begin with the detailed analysis of the degenerate case of the equally rewarded
actions ( = 0), and then examine how the found patterns of behavior change
when one of the actions becomes strictly optimal in terms of rewards ( > 0).
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of the system (11),  = 0, in the parameter space
(τ,Φ). The values of two other parameters are fixed: γ = 0.5, R = 3. Two
curves represent the boundaries of system stability (see Eq. (12)). Inside region
1 the system is stable at the origin and has no other attractors. Inside regions
2 and 3 the system has three equilibria: the origin (q = 0, a = 0) is unstable,
whereas (q = q∗, a = a∗) and (q = −q∗, a = −a∗) are both stable. Label 4
denotes the region where the system trajectory forms a limit cycle and has no
other stable attractors.
3.1 The case of equal rewards
Given that  = 0, system (11) has at least one fixed point (q = 0, a = 0)
regardless of the parameter values. Linear stability analysis of this equilibrium
reveals that it is always stable given γ ≥ 1. In this case the system dynamics is
trivial, so in what follows we assume γ ∈ (0, 1).
The following conditions are found to be necessary and sufficient for the
stability of the system (11),  = 0, at the origin
Φ >
R(1− γ)− 1
τ
− 1 and Φ > R(1− γ)− 1. (12)
Fig. 2 represents the curves defined by inequalities (12) for some fixed values
of R and γ. Given that R > 11−γ , the curves and two coordinate axes form four
regions in the system parameter space. Alternatively, when this assumption is
violated, regions 2 and 3 vanish, but inside the remaining regions the patterns of
the system dynamics persist. We wish to highlight that under the adopted as-
sumptions (γ ∈ (0, 1) and R > 11−γ ) the basic properties of the system behavior
do not depend on γ and R. Hence we perform the detailed analysis of the system
behavior for some fixed values of these parameters (namely, γ = 0.5, R = 3)
without any loss of generality.
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The region of the system phase diagram under label 1 (Fig. 2) corresponds
to the stability of the fixed point (q = 0, a = 0), while in the rest of the
parameter space the system is unstable at the origin, so the system dynamics
may potentially be non-trivial.
By analyzing the first three terms in the Maclaurin series for the right-
hand side of the system (11),  = 0, we derived an approximation for the
condition of emergence of two extra fixed points. In fact, it coincides with
the inverse of the second inequality in (12): the system has three fixed points
when Φ < R(1 − γ) − 1. Thereby, inside the regions 2 and 3 the system has
three equilibria: the unstable origin and two symmetrically located fixed points
(q = q∗, a = a∗) and (q = −q∗, a = −a∗). Numerical simulations reveal that
the latter two equilibria are both stable: the system eventually reaches one of
them depending on the initial conditions. The example of such configuration for
Φ = 1 is illustrated by the triple intersection of the system nullclines represented
in Fig. 3a.
Further numerical analysis demonstrates that inside the region 4, being un-
stable at the origin and having no other fixed points, the system performs pe-
riodic oscillations (Fig. 3b). Both the amplitude and the form of the resulting
limit cycle depend on the time scale parameter τ . For instance, the system
exhibits relaxation oscillations for τ  1.
The deviation of the system trajectory from the equilibrium (q = 0, a = 0)
depending on the key parameter Φ is illustrated in Fig. 4. The deviation mono-
tonically decreases with Φ, except the sharp jump corresponding to the transi-
tion from bistable behavior to oscillations. The dynamics of the system (11),
 = 0, near the boundaries of stability is complex. We discovered that for some
values of Φ the system may have a hysteresis: the dynamics depend essentially
on its history (Fig. 4). At the moment when the system “switches” between
bistable dynamics and periodic oscillations (regions 3 and 4 in Fig. 2) due to
variations of parameter Φ, both of these patterns can be observed depending on
the initial conditions (Fig. 4a). Furthermore, when τ approaches unity another
hysteresis emerges near the border between regions 1 and 4 (Fig. 4b). Such
behavior indicates the complexity of the system dynamics, still, the study of its
details is left for future work.
Fig. 2 summarizes the results of the theoretical and numerical analysis of
system (11),  = 0. The phase variable a contributes to the agent preference
considerably when the parameter Φ characterizing the impact of novelty seeking
exceeds some threshold value. In case of absent or weak impact of novelty
seeking the agent tends to permanently select the option that seemed the most
attractive when the process started (one of the two stable equilibria is reached
depending on the initial conditions, Fig. 3a, Φ = 0.2). When the influence of
novelty seeking becomes strong enough (that is, Φ > R(1 − γ) − 1), the agent
switches to one of two strategies described below depending on the value of the
memory parameter τ .
If τ is small in some sense, i.e., the memories within channel Q fade away
faster comparing to that of channel A, the agent preference begins to oscillate
(Fig. 3b). The mechanism behind these oscillations is rather intuitive. Right
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Figure 3: (a) Nullclines of the system (11),  = 0, for γ = 0.5, R = 3. Nullcline
a˙ = 0 is reproduced twice for Φ = 0.2 and Φ = 1 corresponding respectively
to regions 3 and 4 of the phase diagram in Fig. 2. (b) Phase portraits and
nullclines of the system (11),  = 0, for γ = 0.5, R = 3,Φ = 1. The illustrated
limit cycles are obtained numerically for τ = 0.05 and τ = 0.2 during time
interval of 100 units; initial conditions were chosen randomly at the beginning
of each simulation.
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Figure 4: Dependence of the maximum deviation from the origin of the sys-
tem (11),  = 0, on parameter Φ for (a) τ = 0.2, R = 3, γ = 0.5; (b)
τ = 0.7, R = 10, γ = 0.5. Maximum deviation qmax is defined as the abso-
lute value of the equilibrium coordinate q in the case of stationary motion and
the maximum value of q reached by the periodic orbit in the case of oscilla-
tory behavior. The enlarged fragments demonstrate the hystereses: the system
behavior depends essentially on the initial conditions q0, a0.
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Figure 5: Trajectories of the system (11) for various values of the reward distor-
tion parameter ( ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.27}). The values of other parameters
used for simulations are Φ = 1, τ = 0.2, R = 3, γ = 0.5.
after the adaptation process starts, one of the available options inevitably be-
comes prevalent. If the agent estimate of the objective quality of the currently
preferred alternative becomes relatively high, the corresponding choice proba-
bility approaches unity. At the same time the aversion to this option peaks,
because other options, being almost never selected, appear novel. The high val-
ues of aversion cause the probability to drop, whereas the low aversion allows
it to grow fast; in such manner the periodic behavior emerges. In this case
the increasing impact of novelty seeking destabilizes the dynamics, causing the
choice probability distribution to oscillate continuously.
If Φ is further increased, the choice probabilities distribution becomes stable.
Particularly, when Φ exceeds R(1−γ)−1τ − 1, the origin (q = 0, a = 0) turns to
be stable, so the choice probability distribution is uniform: p1 = p2 = 0.5. In
other words, two options become indistinguishable and the choice is effectively
random.
3.2 The case of unequal rewards
Whenever the system exhibits oscillations in case of equal rewards (region 4 in
Fig. 2), the periodic behavior persists for small enough values of the reward
distortion parameter . The limit cycle gradually shrinks and shifts toward the
higher values of q and a with growing  (see Fig. 5). Finally, the limit cycle
transforms to the stable equilibrium corresponding to the optimal strategy p1 =
1.
In case that the unperturbed system is bistable (regions 2 and 3 in Fig. 2), the
non-zero difference in rewards also does not cause sudden changes in the stability
of the two equilibria (see Fig. 6a). This produces the paradoxical situation when
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Figure 6: Bifurcation diagram of the system (11) for (a) parameter  (with other
parameters fixed at Φ = 0.25, τ = 0.2, R = 3, γ = 0.5) and (b) parameter Φ for
 = 0.1, τ = 0.2, R = 3, γ = 0.5. The instability of the single equilibrium for
Φ ∈ (0.6, 1.5) corresponds to periodic oscillations around this equilibrium.
for some initial values of q and a the agent always favors the option x2, which
minimizes the cumulative reward instead of maximizing it. Not surprisingly,
further increase of  makes this non-optimal equilibrium unstable, so that the
rational strategy p1 = 1 is adopted for practically all initial conditions.
Fig. 6b illustrates how the dynamics of the system depend on the parameter
Φ. For small values of Φ the adaptation process may converge to the non-optimal
strategy p2 = 1 due to specific initial conditions. Remarkably, increase of the
parameter Φ leads to the choice of the optimal strategy (q−a > 0, i.e., p1 ≈ 1).
For some range of values of Φ (e.g., Φ ∈ (0.33, 0.6) in the example illustrated
in Fig. 6b) there is a single equilibrium q − a > 0 which is necessarily achieved
regardless of the initial conditions. The magnitude of q−a gradually decreases,
thereby asymptotically leading to the uniformly random choice (q − a ≈ 0).
However, the transition to the stable equiprobable choice strategy is not smooth:
when Φ exceeds certain threshold, the oscillatory motion emerges (the limit cycle
for Φ = 1.0,  = 0.1 is represented in Fig. 5). Further growth of Φ leads to the
stability of the equilibrium q − a ≈ 0.
Naturally, the presented results are highly preliminary and need thorough in-
vestigation, e.g., the scrutiny of the system hysteretic behavior and the detailed
bifurcation analysis are still to be done.
3.3 Discussion
The analytical and numerical investigations of the system (11) yield several
notable facts about the system dynamics. We highlight and briefly discuss
some of them appealing to the initial assumptions of the proposed model.
1. The model can capture the non-trivial dynamics (namely, unstable oscil-
lations) of the single-agent adaptation in case of two equally rewarded
actions. This situation may be linked to the experimental findings on
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experience-based decision making, where the preference of human sub-
jects fluctuate considerably around the Nash equilibrium in the repeated
choice task with two alternatives [2].
2. When the symmetry of the two actions is distorted, the oscillations persist,
so the agent behavior may be unstable even when the optimal strategy
exists.
3. In case of unequal rewards varying the extent to which novelty seeking
affects the agent choice may lead to surprising changes in the system
dynamics:
(a) When novelty seeking has little effect on the agent choice, the adapta-
tion may stagnate at the non-optimal option. Still, this may happen
only for rather small difference between the two options. The minor
difference in rewards is not enough to motivate the agent initially
inclined to the inferior alternative to switch to the optimal one. In
other words, the lack of novelty seeking may hinder the effective
adaptation process.
(b) Growing impact of novelty seeking makes the agent able to overcome
the initial predisposition and successfully learn the optimal strategy.
It can be interpreted in a way that the increasing influence of the
novelty seeking trait may improve the performance of the adaptation
and thereby make the agent more rational in the end.
(c) However, further increase of the relative impact of novelty seeking
makes the agent choice inconsistent. The interplay between the
reward-seeking and novelty-seeking motives may cause the choice
probabilities to periodically oscillate. Novelty seeking thus appears
as a source of emergence of adaptation instability.
(d) When the impact of novelty seeking becomes in some sense higher
than that of reward seeking, the rewards are effectively neglected
by the agent. All the options become practically equivalent, so the
agent who seeks mainly for novelty ultimately comes to the uniformly
random choice.
The de facto standard single-agent learning model can reproduce only the
most basic, rational behavior pattern: given enough memory capacity, the agent
generally learns the optimal behavior strategy and then strictly follows it [28].
In terms of dynamics it means that for all plausible values of system parameters
the optimal strategy is a stable equilibrium point in the space of all possible
strategies. According to the preliminary analysis, the model presented here can
reproduce much more diverse patterns of the agent behavior. The captured
dynamical behaviors seem psychologically plausible at first glance, although the
model has not yet been directly confronted with the experimental studies on
human adaptation.
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Indeed, many factors other than novelty seeking may hypothetically impact
on the adaptation dynamics. For instance, the proposed extension of the re-
inforcement learning framework can be used to capture the stability-seeking
behavior, when the frequently selected options are preferred by the agent. It is
likely that in many applications both stability seeking and novelty seeking can
be pronounced and may even coexist. Nevertheless, from the dynamical per-
spective the effect of the stability-seeking behavior is of much less interest. The
bias towards the frequently selected actions will most likely lead to the stagna-
tion of the adaptation at the initially preferred alternative. On the other hand,
the factors that drive the agent towards the rarely chosen, novel actions seem
more feasible as an emergence mechanism leading to rich adaptation dynamics.
4 Conclusion
We propose a dynamical model of adaptation in unknown environment under
effect of novelty seeking. In the conventional models used in the non-equilibrium
game theory the learning agents are assumed to act rationally in achieving the
ultimate goal —to maximize the cumulative reward gained during the learning.
Such models lead to complex phenomena only in case of multiple interacting
agents, while the single agent adaptation has been generally presumed to be
trivial up to now.
We challenge this approach by endowing the learning agent with two inter-
acting processing channels. The standard reward-based learning is handled by
the channel Q whereas the channel A is associated with the agent’s attraction
to novel actions. We confine our scope to the case of the single agent adaptation
and demonstrate that novelty seeking may lead to the instability of the learning
dynamics: the intermediate levels of novelty seeking cause the choice probability
distribution to oscillate. Moreover, we discover that the agent characterized by
the moderate impact of novelty seeking can be in a certain sense more rational
comparing to the agent whose choice is governed strictly by rewards.
Our results demonstrate that accounting for more mental complexity of the
agent greatly extends the spectrum of dynamical behaviors captured by the
reinforcement learning model and can enable the basic explanation of transitions
between these behaviors depending on the parameters.
The possible flaw of our highly theoretical analysis is that the psychological
plausibility of the parameter values under which the instability is achieved (i.e.,
τ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1) remains an open question. Nonetheless, we believe that
the presented model may serve as an overall psychologically adequate alternative
to the standard reinforcement learning model, at the same time accounting for
essentially more diverse dynamical phenomena.
The presented model allows for a number of extensions. For instance, it
may aid in studying the effects of the diverse heuristics that humans employ in
judgements and decision making [31] on the dynamics of learning. Another open
question is how exactly would all the discussed effects change the dynamics of the
interaction between multiple agents comprising a complex system? It is entirely
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possible that novelty seeking (and other effects of the similar nature) would
not in general prove itself as an emergence mechanism and would not enrich
the collective adaptation dynamics. Still, we believe that this question is worth
exploring. It is generally agreed that personality traits greatly impact on human
behavior via a variety of factors [5]. Establishing a connection between such
factors and emergent social phenomena is an open problem for both psychology
and computational social science.
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